Trust Directory
Independent public mirror of national PKI trust anchors, not an authority. Certificates are published by each national PKI (e.g., BCCR for Costa Rica); this site mirrors and structures them.
Intermediate CAValid (1239 days left)

Qualified Pseudonymous e-Szigno CA 2009

Hungary · Published by Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH) — National Media and Infocommunications Authority, Hungarian eIDAS supervisory body and national Trusted List scheme operator

Download .pemBack to Hungary

The issuer "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" is not present in this mirror, so the chain below starts at this certificate.

Certificate chain

Trust path from the root down to this certificate.

  1. Qualified Pseudonymous e-Szigno CA 2009Intermediate CA

Certificate fields

Subject (CN)
Qualified Pseudonymous e-Szigno CA 2009
Issuer (CN)
Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009
Role
Intermediate CA
Key algorithm
RSA-2048
Validity
Valid (1239 days left)
Valid from
Valid to
Serial number
17
SHA-256
f8684d2812ba98a52fe94528c4cb152378a2d73a828810a8c7b8529875c64674
Decentralized ID (did:pki)
did:pki:hu:microsec:qualified-pseudonymous-e-szigno-ca-2009Resolve →

This CA is addressable as a did:pki decentralized identifier, derived from its subject and resolvable to a W3C DID Document.

CRL
http://crl.e-szigno.hu/rootca2009.crl
OCSP
http://rootocsp2009.e-szigno.hu
File
qualified-pseudonymous-e-szigno-ca-2009.pem

Provenance

This certificate is public data published by Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH) — National Media and Infocommunications Authority, Hungarian eIDAS supervisory body and national Trusted List scheme operator. This site mirrors and structures it; it is not the issuing authority. The SHA-256 fingerprint above is provided as tamper evidence: recompute it against the downloaded .pem to confirm integrity.

Mirror snapshot generated Jul 23, 2026, 06:39 p.m. UTC.