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Intermediate CAValid (1239 days left)

Qualified e-Szigno TLS CA 2018

Hungary · Published by Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH) — National Media and Infocommunications Authority, Hungarian eIDAS supervisory body and national Trusted List scheme operator

The issuer "Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009" is not present in this mirror, so the chain below starts at this certificate.

Certificate chain

Trust path from the root down to this certificate.

  1. Qualified e-Szigno TLS CA 2018Intermediate CA

Certificate fields

Subject (CN)
Qualified e-Szigno TLS CA 2018
Issuer (CN)
Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009
Role
Intermediate CA
Key algorithm
RSA-2048
Validity
Valid (1239 days left)
Valid from
Valid to
Serial number
00b86edf27d8f6967c6470630a
SHA-256
f7c7e28fb5e79f314aaac6bbba932f15e1a72069f435d4c9e707f93ca1482ee3
Decentralized ID (did:pki)
did:pki:hu:microsec:qualified-e-szigno-tls-ca-2018Resolve →

This CA is addressable as a did:pki decentralized identifier, derived from its subject and resolvable to a W3C DID Document.

CRL
http://rootca2009-crl1.e-szigno.hu/rootca2009.crl
http://rootca2009-crl2.e-szigno.hu/rootca2009.crl
http://rootca2009-crl3.e-szigno.hu/rootca2009.crl
OCSP
http://rootca2009-ocsp1.e-szigno.hu
http://rootca2009-ocsp2.e-szigno.hu
http://rootca2009-ocsp3.e-szigno.hu
File
qualified-e-szigno-tls-ca-2018.pem

Provenance

This certificate is public data published by Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH) — National Media and Infocommunications Authority, Hungarian eIDAS supervisory body and national Trusted List scheme operator. This site mirrors and structures it; it is not the issuing authority. The SHA-256 fingerprint above is provided as tamper evidence: recompute it against the downloaded .pem to confirm integrity.

Mirror snapshot generated Jul 23, 2026, 06:39 p.m. UTC.