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Intermediate CAValid (5858 days left)

e-Szigno TSA CA 2020

Hungary · Published by Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH) — National Media and Infocommunications Authority, Hungarian eIDAS supervisory body and national Trusted List scheme operator

The issuer "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" is not present in this mirror, so the chain below starts at this certificate.

Certificate chain

Trust path from the root down to this certificate.

  1. e-Szigno TSA CA 2020Intermediate CA

Certificate fields

Subject (CN)
e-Szigno TSA CA 2020
Issuer (CN)
e-Szigno Root CA 2017
Role
Intermediate CA
Key algorithm
EC P-256
Validity
Valid (5858 days left)
Valid from
Valid to
Serial number
d11c60534e95c90ea5b9600a
SHA-256
b4c177e357565c99e90ed886d799f8c6beff806da5a048551878489b9c27e488
Decentralized ID (did:pki)
did:pki:hu:microsec:e-szigno-tsa-ca-2020Resolve →

This CA is addressable as a did:pki decentralized identifier, derived from its subject and resolvable to a W3C DID Document.

CRL
http://rootca2017-crl1.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl
http://rootca2017-crl2.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl
http://rootca2017-crl3.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl
OCSP
http://rootca2017-ocsp1.e-szigno.hu
http://rootca2017-ocsp2.e-szigno.hu
http://rootca2017-ocsp3.e-szigno.hu
File
e-szigno-tsa-ca-2020.pem

Provenance

This certificate is public data published by Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH) — National Media and Infocommunications Authority, Hungarian eIDAS supervisory body and national Trusted List scheme operator. This site mirrors and structures it; it is not the issuing authority. The SHA-256 fingerprint above is provided as tamper evidence: recompute it against the downloaded .pem to confirm integrity.

Mirror snapshot generated Jul 23, 2026, 06:39 p.m. UTC.