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Intermediate CAValid (952 days left)

e-Szigno RSA Qualified TLS CA 2026

Hungary · Published by Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH) — National Media and Infocommunications Authority, Hungarian eIDAS supervisory body and national Trusted List scheme operator

The issuer "e-Szigno RSA TLS Root CA 2025" is not present in this mirror, so the chain below starts at this certificate.

Certificate chain

Trust path from the root down to this certificate.

  1. e-Szigno RSA Qualified TLS CA 2026Intermediate CA

Certificate fields

Subject (CN)
e-Szigno RSA Qualified TLS CA 2026
Issuer (CN)
e-Szigno RSA TLS Root CA 2025
Role
Intermediate CA
Key algorithm
RSA-3072
Validity
Valid (952 days left)
Valid from
Valid to
Serial number
013ed5549ef71d0972a4c2320a
SHA-256
399cc6d3d41b81f582139244b6b5d8f09e95e571030a6277f8f4051b2e17af66
Decentralized ID (did:pki)
did:pki:hu:microsec:e-szigno-rsa-qualified-tls-ca-2026Resolve →

This CA is addressable as a did:pki decentralized identifier, derived from its subject and resolvable to a W3C DID Document.

CRL
http://tlsrootca2025-crl.e-szigno.hu/tlsrootca2025.crl
OCSP
http://tlsrootca2025-ocsp.e-szigno.hu
File
e-szigno-rsa-qualified-tls-ca-2026.pem

Provenance

This certificate is public data published by Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH) — National Media and Infocommunications Authority, Hungarian eIDAS supervisory body and national Trusted List scheme operator. This site mirrors and structures it; it is not the issuing authority. The SHA-256 fingerprint above is provided as tamper evidence: recompute it against the downloaded .pem to confirm integrity.

Mirror snapshot generated Jul 23, 2026, 06:39 p.m. UTC.