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Intermediate CAValid (952 days left)

e-Szigno Qualified TLS CA 2026

Hungary · Published by Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH) — National Media and Infocommunications Authority, Hungarian eIDAS supervisory body and national Trusted List scheme operator

The issuer "e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023" is not present in this mirror, so the chain below starts at this certificate.

Certificate chain

Trust path from the root down to this certificate.

  1. e-Szigno Qualified TLS CA 2026Intermediate CA

Certificate fields

Subject (CN)
e-Szigno Qualified TLS CA 2026
Issuer (CN)
e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023
Role
Intermediate CA
Key algorithm
EC P-256
Validity
Valid (952 days left)
Valid from
Valid to
Serial number
014185eeb7d30ee5dc4c01020a
SHA-256
cbba5afbb7e493c2d1edfbb3b162394bfcec0345a66dc1a167b203d534fbc15f
Decentralized ID (did:pki)
did:pki:hu:microsec:e-szigno-qualified-tls-ca-2026Resolve →

This CA is addressable as a did:pki decentralized identifier, derived from its subject and resolvable to a W3C DID Document.

CRL
http://tlsrootca2023-crl.e-szigno.hu/tlsrootca2023.crl
OCSP
http://tlsrootca2023-ocsp.e-szigno.hu
File
e-szigno-qualified-tls-ca-2026.pem

Provenance

This certificate is public data published by Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH) — National Media and Infocommunications Authority, Hungarian eIDAS supervisory body and national Trusted List scheme operator. This site mirrors and structures it; it is not the issuing authority. The SHA-256 fingerprint above is provided as tamper evidence: recompute it against the downloaded .pem to confirm integrity.

Mirror snapshot generated Jul 23, 2026, 06:39 p.m. UTC.