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Intermediate CAValid (5858 days left)

e-Szigno Qualified Pseudonymous CA 2017

Hungary · Published by Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH) — National Media and Infocommunications Authority, Hungarian eIDAS supervisory body and national Trusted List scheme operator

The issuer "e-Szigno Root CA 2017" is not present in this mirror, so the chain below starts at this certificate.

Certificate chain

Trust path from the root down to this certificate.

  1. e-Szigno Qualified Pseudonymous CA 2017Intermediate CA

Certificate fields

Subject (CN)
e-Szigno Qualified Pseudonymous CA 2017
Issuer (CN)
e-Szigno Root CA 2017
Role
Intermediate CA
Key algorithm
EC P-256
Validity
Valid (5858 days left)
Valid from
Valid to
Serial number
9f1d566220b1e414fb913d0a
SHA-256
1648ce4ab1bb65c485cb2236c768fabb865147d426915b92afbca81e9b2ee3bc
Decentralized ID (did:pki)
did:pki:hu:microsec:e-szigno-qualified-pseudonymous-ca-2017Resolve →

This CA is addressable as a did:pki decentralized identifier, derived from its subject and resolvable to a W3C DID Document.

CRL
http://rootca2017-crl1.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl
http://rootca2017-crl2.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl
http://rootca2017-crl3.e-szigno.hu/rootca2017.crl
OCSP
http://rootca2017-ocsp1.e-szigno.hu
http://rootca2017-ocsp2.e-szigno.hu
http://rootca2017-ocsp3.e-szigno.hu
File
e-szigno-qualified-pseudonymous-ca-2017.pem

Provenance

This certificate is public data published by Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH) — National Media and Infocommunications Authority, Hungarian eIDAS supervisory body and national Trusted List scheme operator. This site mirrors and structures it; it is not the issuing authority. The SHA-256 fingerprint above is provided as tamper evidence: recompute it against the downloaded .pem to confirm integrity.

Mirror snapshot generated Jul 23, 2026, 06:39 p.m. UTC.